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 1 
Abstract 
Do turnover and distributive partisan motivations affect government borrowing more so than 
traditional funding sources like taxes and transfers? Electoral competition between a variety of 
parties is critically important for the health of a democratic regime. However, there is an inherent 
tension between government electoral responsiveness and policy stability. Competing party 
platforms can have radically different views when it comes to governance, and state institutions 
need time to meld to the priorities of a new government while maintaining their structural integrity. 
This tension co-exists with the fact that fiscal strains on governments have risen with growing 
expectations by citizens of the public sector’s responsibilities. These responsibilities can broadly 
be financed by taxing constituents, borrowing capital, or receiving transfers in the case of 
subnational governments. Given the lower short-term political costs of debt versus new taxes, the 
political leaders who manage these public finances may have incentives to borrow, especially 
when high turnover means their time horizon in office is short or party bases vulnerable to 
clientelism make cheap capital valuable. Contrary to this assumption, using a regression 
discontinuity analyzing Mexican mayors who won close elections, I do not find evidence that 
electoral turnover or partisan motivations affect debt funding. However, I do find support for prior 
scholarship suggesting partisan motivations in transfers to local governments.  These results carry 
important implications for our understanding of the stability effects of electoral turnover, how 
parties finance distributive politics, and the fiscal effects of intergovernmental partisan alignment.  
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1) Introduction 
 Electoral competition between a variety of parties and candidates is critically important to 
the health of a democratic regime. Citizens’ ability to coordinate with one another about what 
policy platform best reflects their interests and to enforce change keeps governments responsive 
to their constituents’ changing desires. Therefore, turnover in electoral offices, be it a president or 
a local sheriff, can ideally be a sign of a healthy democratic process in that citizens are choosing 
leaders most able to compete for votes by convincing the public about the value of their unique 
policy platform. Challenger candidates can institute reforms that citizens desire, while incumbents 
stay tuned in to their constituents by having to compete on their record at regular intervals. The 
extreme alternative is one party autocratic governance where leaders can institute policies without 
broader approval or accountability. 
 However, there is an inherent tension as it applies to electoral turnover between 
government electoral responsiveness and government stability. Competing party platforms can 
have radically different views when it comes to governance, and state institutions need time to 
meld to the priorities of a new government while maintaining their structural integrity. 
Additionally, policies that help constituents can have long time horizons. In these ways, frequent 
government turnover can lead to policy incoherence and limited investment as incumbents 
deprioritize longer term reforms since their probability of electoral survival into the future is so 
low.  
 This tension co-exists with the fact that fiscal strains on governments at all levels have, for 
the most part, risen with growing expectations by citizens of the public sector’s responsibilities. 
In many states, between the Interwar period and the 21st century public social spending alone as a 
percentage of gross domestic product multiplied by factors around thirty times (Ortiz-Ospina & 
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Roser, 2018). In more recent decades a greater proportion of this spending has been reassigned to 
more local levels of government, as well (Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015). In many cases, though, 
these increases in expenditure have not been matched by commensurate growth in revenue 
collection. While tax bureaucracies have by and large grown and become more efficient, most 
states still have yearly deficits.  
This is where public debt plays an important role in filling the shortfall in revenue. Since 
states have significant collateral in the form of future tax revenue, regular debt issuance within 
moderation is not problematic, especially if those funds go towards policies with higher rates of 
return. The growth of the capital markets in the past decades has granted governments across the 
world and at different levels access to relatively cheap debt (United Nations, 2016). However, 
public finances are typically not bureaucratized but instead managed by elected political leaders. 
Given the high political costs of raising tax revenue in the present, electoral incentives typically 
lead such politicians to prioritize debt to fund the public sector (Tilly, 1990). This temptation is 
potentially dangerous since excessive debt can lead to intergenerational inequity as future citizens 
must pay growing interest costs, investors lose savings and governments fall into dysfunction. 
 Integrating these potentially problematic public debt incentives with our current 
understanding of political turnover and party politics is imperative to better predicting government 
behavior and understanding possible institutional checks on politically motivated fiscal largesse. 
A central question of this thesis is: why do political turnover and party alignment affect 
government financing behavior? I employ data from Mexican municipalities to analyze this 
relationship.   
 Using a regression discontinuity design examining over one thousand close Mexican 
mayoral races, I find no evidence that turnover, party incentives to patronize, or intrastate 
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coordination affected debt issuance. Meanwhile, political determinants like party association and 
alignment had a statistically  greater influence on the two other funding sources governments have: 
taxes and transfers. Interestingly, these associations were strongest when local mayors ruled with 
governors of the same party leading their state. Overall, these results indicate that debt issuance 
may be less swayed by political determinants than taxes or transfers, but also that investors may 
not effectively price corruption in lending. 
 As debt available to previously excluded governments increases, it is crucially important 
to have insight into how change within these administrations affects public financing given its 
material impacts on public service provision. Although much has been written about political 
turnover, public debt, patronage incentives, and partisan alignment, this thesis seeks to integrate 
these fields of knowledge and offer new insight into best practices for electoral competition.  
 In Section 2 I offer an overview of the current understanding of debt and capital in the 
public sector, political turnover, machine politics, and government strength. Next, I offer context 
for the Mexican case in Section 3, and introduce the regression discontinuity design that I use to 
test these relationships in Section 4. I present my results in Section 5 alongside robustness checks. 
Since debt as a funding source can be measured in different ways and is intertwined with taxes and 
transfers, Section 6 is devoted to teasing out how the same political determinants could affect 
alternate these dependent variables. I discuss how these findings fit with existing theory in Section 
7 and conclude with the implications and weaknesses of my results in Sections 8. 
 
 
2) Literature Review & Theory 
A - Financing the Public Sector 
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 To begin at the highest level, it is important to conceptualize two broad sources of capital 
for any government: taxes and debt. From a sovereign perspective, there is already a significant 
literature on how the implicit political costs of raising taxes are higher than the explicit debt service 
payments associated with borrowing.  From the perspective of the executive, this is because raising 
taxes requires the logistical costs of building a revenue collection infrastructure as well as the 
political sacrifices that raising revenue historically entails: empowerment of an independent 
bureaucracy and pushback from constituent taxpayers (Tilly, 1990). Although there is some doubt 
in the literature as to whether fiscal austerity affects government survival, this is more focused on 
expenditure cuts, and it is important to note that executives have incentives to avoid fiscal austerity 
(Arias & Stasavage, 2018).  
Contrast this with the dynamics of governmental debt issuance and the relative 
attractiveness of borrowed capital becomes clear; debt repayment is typically due years in the 
future, and the shorter the time horizon for government the greater the incentive to issue since the 
probability of that government needing to repay that debt service is lower (Queralt, 2018). This is 
a type of externalization of the cost of public finances on to future generations. In addition, 
sovereign debtors have historically been able to re-negotiate lower debt service payments, 
concessions, or outright forgiveness.  In the abstract, a given government is likely to prefer raising 
debt instead of internal revenues due to the associated political costs. 
 Tailoring this view to the subnational level grants more specificity but the relationship 
generally remains the same. Moving away from broad arguments about the costs to centralized 
executives of building tax-collecting bureaucracies, there are more practical costs to local and 
regional democratic governments of raising taxes. Mainly, voters generally are opposed to higher 
taxes, and given a government’s desire to survive, political leaders are disincentivized from 
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proposing tax increases. While raising debt may still be controversial, it tends to evoke less of an 
immediate response from voters precisely because the costs are assigned to later generations of 
constituents (Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015).  
Subnational politicians also have a capital source unavailable to their national counterparts 
in the form of federal transfers.  These are generally preferable to new taxes since local elites get 
to externalize the costs of raising revenue to the entire state instead of having their constituents 
internalize the entire cost of a new tax. If funds from the central government carried with them no 
contingencies for subnational leaders, then this would be the best funding source. However, 
governments typically attach mandates for expenditure to these transfers, so local jurisdictions 
may not have much flexibility in how to spend them (Stiglitz & Rosengard, 2015).  In addition, 
central revenue-sharing formulas that have become more common generally make the transfers a 
subnational unit receives regular, predictable, and open to limited formal discretion (Careaga & 
Weingast 2001, Timmons & Broid, 2013).  
Even at the subnational level, debt is still more attractive than new revenue collection and 
potentially could be more advantageous than intergovernmental transfers depending on the 
associated political costs and flexibility. Given the attractiveness of subnational public debt, 
institutional checks like debt limits are common in order to avoid abuse.  These are encouraged by 
the national level government that could be liable to creditors if a subnational unit defaults on its 
debt (Seitz, 2000).  
 Evidence from the literature supporting this dynamic wherein governments prefer debt over 
tax funding is robust. Along with showing how sovereign states going back through the 1800s by 
and large debt financed war when credit was available, Queralt (2018) also shows the long term 
detrimental impact such external funding can have on state capacity. Arias (2018) develops the 
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idea of credit availability further by analyzing how both sovereign states and local municipalities 
issue more when Federal Reserve-influenced borrowing costs are low and use these funds for 
patronage similar to how resource-endowed states employ commodity rents. However, the goal of 
this thesis is to build on the understanding that political executives prefer debt funding by 
observing how turnover and party alignment affect this behavior.  Successful challengers may find 
themselves under greater pressure to reward clients from their campaign with available credit and 
avoid upsetting their new constituents with tax hikes as they adjust to implementing their policy 
platform. 
B - Political Turnover 
 The key effect of political turnover that has been a concern for scholars relates to stability 
in that if the state, one of the most important actors in both society and the economy, is changing 
priorities and leadership at a rapid pace, then the resulting uncertainty could breed inefficient 
public governance and private underinvestment. Within the literature, there is a keen focus on the 
institutional separation of powers as a source of variation that can exacerbate wider instability if it 
is weak or serve as a mitigant when it is strong. The separation of powers is crucial because there 
are functions of the state that citizens expect political leaders to have influence over to enact their 
policy platform, while there are many state-sponsored services that are meant to operate 
consistently regardless of the government in power. Such services include criminal justice, public 
education, and basic water infrastructure maintenance. While elected officials can reform these 
institutions more broadly, if political turnover is common and these officials hold sway over day-
to-day operations of these services then that turnover could trickle down and breed inefficiency in 
the administration of public goods. 
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Akhtari et al. (2017) offer an illustrative example of this relationship using evidence from 
Brazilian municipalities wherein mayoral turnover bred decreases in public education outcomes 
as new mayors would fire school headmasters to hire clients, teachers would leave due to 
frustration with unqualified new headmasters, and student performance would suffer as a result. 
Turnover effects are not reserved to the public sector, though. Earle & Gehlbach (2014) provide 
data indicating that large Ukrainian firms in regions that supported a winning candidate saw 
systematically higher productivity gains than counterparts in regions that voted against the new 
president; the authors attribute this disparity to “particularistic” support from the new government 
to those firms. The detrimental effects of improper institutional insulation of political turnover are 
clear: children can receive lower quality schooling and firms can enjoy greater profits based 
moreso off partisan affiliation than market innovation. However, policies that can mitigate these 
problems, while by no means easy to implement, are well known. School districts can operate 
independently of local elected officials while still being beholden to education reform at higher 
levels of government, and an independent judiciary can strike down particularistic economic 
policies.  
Thus, the goal of this thesis is to examine the effect of political turnover on public 
financing, a state process that is difficult to depoliticize because elected officials in either the 
legislature or executive branch determine the budget and what services will be financed by taxes 
versus debt. The key importance to understanding a potential dynamic between turnover and debt 
is that intergenerational equity could be damaged if the former distorted the latter. An intuitive 
picture of this relationship from the demand side would be insecure politicians elected to office 
for the first time issuing beyond what is economically rational for their constituency in order to 
fund ostentatious projects that propel their careers. With that said there is potential for the opposite 
 9 
effect to be at work from the supply side of debt. Investors could be wary of new parties coming 
into power and lock them out of the capital markets in terms of loan access or pricing.  Either 
outcome is detrimental to citizens as the former leads to a greater debt burden whereas the latter 
hamstrings potential reformers and development. 
Luckily, there is already a literature on this turnover-debt relationship. Among developed 
national governments Grechyna (2016) finds evidence for higher public debt where turnover is 
more frequent while Calcagno & Escaleras (2006) find that the fiscal performance of U.S states 
with greater party alternation is poorer than those with less turnover.  However, this thesis seeks 
to expand on our current understanding of this relationship between turnover and public debt by 
examining it through the lens of distributional party differences and intergovernmental friction. In 
addition, this analysis builds on prior studies by utilizing a larger sample of observations that pivots 
towards local government in the developing world and incorporates a regression discontinuity 
design to bolster internal validity and causality of the observed effects. 
A key concern when analyzing turnover is endogeneity arising from voter perception of 
the available candidates. Citizens choose at the ballot box based on whether they approve of the 
incumbent’s policies or seek to change the state of their polity with new leadership. In a developing 
state like Mexico where material concerns are highly important to voters, their perception of the 
incumbent’s effect on the economy are critical to any election. However, this raises a key concern 
with voters’ ability to correctly attribute economic conditions to their leaders’ actual policies. 
Although Fearon (1999) argues that citizens use practical shortcuts to discern politicians that will 
act in good faith, Campello & Zucco (2015) find that Latin American voters misattribute 
exogenous economic conditions to leader performance. This misattribution raises critical questions 
for this thesis since debt issuance is directly tied to a political leader’s economic policy choices. 
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To mitigate the endogenous effect voter perception may have on turnover outcomes I employ a 
regression discontinuity design to restrict the observations to cases where incumbent victory was 
as good as random. 
C - Party Difference 
 A keen understanding of party incentives and differences can help get to the core of why a 
new government coming to power might affect public finances at all. For this, some basic 
background on how parties compete for office is required. Some of the earliest literature on this 
topic offers a useful conceptualization of individual voters and wider interest groups as being 
inclined to vote for a given party or candidate based on two factors: policy alignment and transfer 
receipts (Dixit & Londregan, 1996). Cox & McCubbins (1986) discuss how earlier social 
deterministic models of voting behavior outlined how interest groups within the wider voting bloc 
are generally aligned with a given party based on shared policy goals or shared background. This 
historic alignment of interest groups with certain parties is part of why electoral coalitions are so 
counterintuitively stable. Indeed, the elite fear in the early modern age was that a democratic 
regime where voters could select radically different policy priorities every set number of years 
would lead to rampant instability. Instead, many of the observable democratic systems in the world 
today are made up of interest groups that vote predictably and reliably for the same parties that 
they have been aligned with for decades. That is why elections that upset this alignment, such as 
the 1968 election in the U.S, are considered so rare and historic. 
 Thus, the relative stability of policy alignment makes distributions the key method by 
which parties compete for votes. This is often referred to as “redistributive politics” and takes 
many forms. In the context of U.S Congressional elections, federal funds that representatives 
allocate to their districts from the annual budget are a key form of redistributive politics that can 
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win over interest groups (Dixit & Londregan, 1996). In the developing world, redistribution often 
takes the form of patronage or clientelism, in which voters are offered jobs in the public sector if 
the party wins or sometimes simply direct wealth transfers in exchange for their vote; much of the 
literature emphasizes the importance of local operatives and brokers in maintaining such a 
distribution network (Robinson & Verdier, 2013). 
However, parties have limited resources they can redistribute to potential voters, so their 
electoral strategy is focused on allocating these promised funds in a way that will maximize their 
turnout and likelihood of victory. A comparison between political parties and an investor is helpful: 
in the same way that an investor has limited funds in their portfolio which they can allocate to 
various asset classes with different expected returns, parties know the different interest groups 
within their voting bloc and how those groups will react to promised redistributions (Mageloni et 
al., 2007).  
 Three broad categories for potential constituents are helpful from the perspective of a given 
party: support groups, opposition groups, and swing groups. The former are those that are naturally 
aligned with the party and would likely vote in the absence of distributions, but promising them 
transfers may increase turnout; opposition groups are simply that, aligned with a different party 
and unlikely to support even with distributions. Meanwhile, the paradigmatic swing voter is 
indifferent between parties and will vote for whichever can give the most credible offer of the 
largest transfer. Continuing the investor analogy, because of the risk associated with investing in 
swing groups that may defect based on a higher offer, the common empirical observation is that 
parties invest in mobilizing their support bases in the same way that risk-averse investors prefer 
low-risk securities (Cox & McCubbins, 1986). In races where competing parties are equivalently 
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efficient at mobilizing their bases, patronizing swing groups becomes key to victory (Dixit & 
Londregan, 1996).  
 However, these interest groups are highly different from one another and this variance 
shapes divergent patronage strategies among competing parties. For example, there is significant 
evidence that poorer voters are more likely to respond to and be targeted by agents offering 
patronage because the value of the material transfer relative to their existing wealth is greater 
(Robinson & Verdier, 2013; Stokes, 2005). Thus, parties that are historically aligned with a poorer 
voting bases are more likely to engage in patronage than those attached to the middle class because 
the electoral returns for each dollar of patronage investment are higher. Mageloni et al. (2007) 
explore this dynamic in Mexico, where the PRI’s base of support lies in poorer rural jurisdictions 
while the PAN’s contains the urban middle class. They find that the former is more effective at 
patronage politics because they need that tactic to mobilize their base. Given this understanding of 
how different parties promise redistributions in anticipation of electoral success, one goal of this 
thesis is to observe how they finance that patronage once they have secured office. 
 A simplifying assumption of some redistribution models is that once a party wins office, 
they will have access to the state coffers which they can use to patronize supporters at their 
discretion. However, these new governments are not given a pot of free money, but instead face 
decisions about how to finance both their legitimate policy proposals and illegitimate patronage. 
Arias (2018) finds that political leaders do indeed strategically use public debt to finance patronage 
distributions, especially when the borrowing cost of that debt is low. Thus, we can synthesize 
literature on redistributive politics and the financing of patronage to try and observe if a party with 
a greater patronage base borrows more than its opponents to feed its machine.  
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 There is an existing literature on how the electoral success of different parties associates 
with changes in public finances. Significant evidence from both the U.S and Europe supports the 
idea that the ascension of parties that are considered further left is associated with expansionary 
fiscal policy and thus more debt (Le Meaux et al 2011, Cusak 1997, Abbott & Jones 2011, Potrafke 
& Bjornshov 2010). However, it is unclear if that relationship results from the ideological 
disposition of these political leaders or from an interest group common to different leftist parties 
that incentivizes additional borrowing to reward their base. By analyzing a case where ideological 
pull is weaker than patronage effects and by comparing a party heavily reliant on patronage given 
its base to competitors both to the left and right ideologically, this thesis contributes to the literature 
by teasing out the strategic angle from the ideological. 
D -Government Conflict & Cooperation 
 The last dimension this thesis explores is whether intergovernmental support affects debt 
issuance and broader public sector financing. At any level of the modern democratic regime, when 
a new government is elected they do not have complete discretion to pursue their policy 
preferences, but instead face limitations from other loci of power within the state. From the 
perspective of the executive these can be the legislative or judicial branches, while entrenched 
bureaucracies can stymie new administrations. Additionally, in federal systems authorities at local 
or higher levels can stall policy implementation as well.  
 The interaction between executives and their legislatures is very well documented in the 
literature. Depending on the institutional framework, government weakness can take different 
forms. For presidential systems, executives are typically weakened when their party does not fully 
control one or both chambers of the legislature. Meanwhile, for parliamentary systems the 
governing party can be conceptualized as weaker when it lacks the seats to govern alone in a 
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majority; in such cases the executive minister must either sacrifice ministerial positions to form a 
coalition or operate as a minority government. 
 Studies on how executive weakness in the form of divided, coalition, or minority 
governments affect public finances differ in terms of results and the specific policy output they 
use as the dependent variable. The seminal theory in this space is the Weak Governments 
Hypothesis, which originally claimed that governments arranged around multi-party coalitions are 
likely to have more debt due to the added difficulty of reaching consensus among contradicting 
platforms (Roubini & Sachs 1989). Scholars have developed this hypothesis significantly to 
account for different governing arrangements that would entail less consensus, different potential 
mechanisms for why there would be a divergent output for “weaker” governments, different policy 
outputs besides just debt, and importantly, different levels of government below the national.  
Although there is some dissent as to whether or not this relationship exists in the long run, 
a variety of studies have generally found a similar relationship between government weakness 
under different measurements and looser fiscal policy outputs (Potrafke & Bjornshov, 2010). 
Articles examining expenditure, revenue collection, deficits, and debt in contexts as diverse as 
French departments, Flemish municipalities, Indian states, German Lander, Spanish 
municipalities, and U.S states have generally supported the idea that the level of fragmentation of 
the government leads to looser public finances (Cabases et al 2006, Dash & Raja 2013,Le Meaux 
et al. 2011, Geys 2005,Jochimsen & Nuscheler 2011). Thus, the effect of horizontal, or between 
branch, government weakness on fiscal policy has been well documented. 
What this thesis contributes is an exploration of how vertical, or between level, weakness 
may influence public debt policy. Calvo & Murillo (2004) offer an excellent top-down exploration 
of this dynamic as it applies to patronage; they found that favorable geographic distribution of 
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Peronist politicians in local offices severely marred the efficacy of presidents from the opposing 
Radical faction of Argentine politics. While this is an interesting top-down analysis of vertical 
government weakness, the emphasis here is on bottom-up interactions, or how having an opposing 
officeholder at the state level above a local executive affects that mayor’s borrowing behavior.  
This is valuable for a number of reasons. First, because the number of local executives is 
necessarily so much larger than president-governor interactions, the statistical power will be 
stronger. Again, since so many key public services are provided at municipal levels of governance, 
these interactions are becoming more important as the burden falling to local politicians increases. 
Indeed, the interactions between local leaders and regional governors can have just as much 
influence on public service provision as sweeping federal reforms. Finally, a deep analysis of the 
effect of government conflict on public finances from a vertical perspective could carry profound 
implications for the Weak Government Hypothesis. 
 One key causal mechanism behind this horizontal theory that has support in the 
evidence thus far is the inaction model (Ashworth et al. 2005). In this model adding parties that 
need to approve policies to any government, parliamentary or presidential, adds veto players with 
incentives that are not aligned. Thus, budget compromises are more difficult, and as a result the 
government defers to more debt. An adjustment to the context of vertical accountability is feasible 
and has a critical variable not included in models of horizontal weakness in the form of inter-level 
transfers. In the interaction between a mayor and governor of opposing parties, the latter may have 
the power to deny or stall transfers to the local political leader, pushing that municipality to lean 
on more debt or taxes to fund its projects. To some extent, this would be in accordance with the 
Weak Government Hypothesis. Alternatively, if governors strategically know that debt is the 
lowest cost capital source for the mayors in their state, they may ignore over-issuance by allied 
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local governments while closely scrutinizing mayors from rival parties who try to borrow.   
Political turnover and party type may have profound impacts on the debt behavior of elected 
officials, and the additional effect of intergovernmental support is also important to understanding 
the entire relationship.  
 
3) Case Background 
Mexico is a federal republic made up first of thirty-one states and the federal district of Mexico 
City. Below that administrative level 2,448 municipalities function as local governments providing 
security, water and sewer services. Presidentes Municipales serve as mayors of these 
municipalities and are elected via plurality every three years separately from other offices. Term 
limits restrict any one individual from serving as mayor in consecutive terms, but parties can run 
new candidates each election cycle to remain in power.  
Although responsible for these key public goods, the tax base of most municipalities is 
circumscribed to fees and property taxes. Given this disconnect municipalities source almost half 
of their funds from federal and state transfers.  The largest and most important of these funds are 
participaciones, which are levied by the federal government throughout all of Mexico. Using a 
revenue-sharing formula, the central state then allocates how much capital should go to each 
municipality and transfers the funds to state governments to disperse accordingly. However, state 
legislatures in Mexico are notoriously weak and there is evidence that governors deviate from the 
assigned formula in handing out participaciones to municipalities based on both partisan and 
emergency reasoning (Timmons & Broid, 2013). 
All three levels of the state in Mexico are allowed to borrow to fund the public sector 
services they provide. Presidentes Municipales can borrow via public development banks, private 
 17 
commercial banks, or bond emissions; access by source runs in descending order among the three 
as only the most credit-worthy municipalities can issue bonds whereas cost efficiency rises in 
ascending order given strict project-centered covenants imposed by development banks (Benton, 
2017). Although most states have laws which impose debt limits on all municipalities within their 
borders, governors have discretion over their execution, so these ceilings are weakly enforced 
(Benton & Smith, 2017). Federal reform of municipal borrowing practices in 2000 further 
standardized and regulated mayors’ ability to borrow. 
After the Mexican Revolution of the early 1900s, the Institutional Party of the Revolution 
(the PRI) governed Mexico as essentially a one-party state for decades with nominal elections to 
all offices. The party sustained itself, especially in poor and rural areas of Mexico, based on a 
deeply embedded patronage network that exchanged material transfers for votes. However, 
popular disenchantment with the PRI as well as international pressure to liberalize led to local and 
state politics in Mexico becoming more electorally competitive in the last decades of the 20th 
century. This trend came to a head in the election of 2000, when the center right opposition 
National Action Party (PAN) won the presidency.  The PAN had been Mexico’s main opposition 
party since before World War Two, but only began to capture local and state elected offices in the 
1980s and 1990s. The third electorally competitive rival to arise in the during the PRI’s national 
twilight was the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution, a faction of the state party that broke 
off entirely amid internal conflict. Although the PRD and PAN were ostensibly opposed 
ideologically, ending the PRI’s dominance became a shared goal as its central control waned; 
informal and formal cooperation between the two opposition parties was not uncommon. The PRI 
was a unique party in the Mexican political system in its deep ties with the broader state and a 
decades old patronage system which its rivals could not compete with. 
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Since the decline of the PRI in the late 20th century, local politics in Mexico have been 
electorally competitive, offering robust variation in terms of turnover, mayoral party affiliation, 
and support from state governments. With that said, while being more democratic than lower 
income developing countries, Mexican elections do suffer from illiberal practices such as vote 
buying and intimidation (Larreguy et al., 2017). 
 
4) Research Design 
A - Margin of Victory as a Key Instrument 
To go about testing the effect of political turnover on any output, election years where 
turnover could occur or not should be the key focus as the unit of analysis. Given a large universe 
of comparable elections to the same type of office, we could then observe how the survival or 
defeat of an incumbent affected subsequent debt behavior of the new or renewed government. For 
this purpose, mayoral elections in Mexico offer an excellent case to analyze.  
 This sample should carry healthy internal validity because constitutional rules, the office 
up for election, and cultural similarities are all broadly consistent across the municipalities (Arias 
2018). Thus, the goal is simply to observe differences in debt behavior among Mexican municipal 
governments, some of whom are newly elected and others that have recently survived an election. 
 However, there is a significant endogeneity problem with simply looking at the entire 
population of elections. An incumbent party’s victory or defeat is largely based on voters’ 
perception of their performance, and that perception may be tied to the party’s fiscal management. 
To take the entire population of elections would risk pooling together municipalities where one 
party won by large margins over long periods of time that could be systematically different from 
ones with frequent, close turnover in ways that the test may not see. The ideal situation is a large 
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sample of municipality-election years where the treatment of each data point with either incumbent 
turnover or survival is random, like in a true experiment. For this purpose, a regression 
discontinuity design helps mitigate endogeneity and brings the analysis closer to said ideal. Such 
an analysis restricts the sample to only those data points close to an exogenous differentiation 
level, such that the allocation of observations on either side of the boundary is as good as random 
(Eggers et al., 2015). 
 Since Mexican mayoral elections are decided using one round first past the post voting and 
generally have two main parties running, the discontinuity here is the margin by which the 
incumbent party won or lost the election. Thus, the sample will only include municipality-election 
years where the incumbent won or lost by a small margin of victory. The cutoff functions as an 
effective discontinuity because, assuming two competitors, parties that win forty nine percent of 
the vote and lose are more similar to those that win fifty one percent and secure office than those 
that win thirty nine percent and also lose. That is, the intuitive picture of a municipality where the 
incumbent party lost by one percent is where electoral competition is fierce and almost half the 
electorate still supports them, similar to if they had won by one point whereas an eleven-point loss 
implies the electorate decidedly rejected their platform. In situations where voter support for the 
two main competing parties is so tight, the victor can be decided by exogenous factors such as rain 
depressing voter turnout in one competitor’s precinct, so we say that the treatment of incumbent 
loss or victory is as good as random. 
The question then becomes how tight the bandwidth around the win/loss discontinuity 
should be. Luckily, incorporating a dataset of Mexican mayoral elections compiled by Eggers et 
al. (2015) between 1994 and 2008 the sample remains robustly large at a number of cutoffs near 
the discontinuity, and I begin my analysis using a threshold of plus or minus five percentage points.  
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Thus, I first regress political turnover against debt behavior in order to analyze if incumbent parties 
act differently from successful challengers upon entering office. Given their insecure position as a 
new government in a competitive municipality, successful challengers may issue more debt to fund 
projects or distributions promised to their constituents in order to quickly build a base of support. 
The graph in Figure 1 shows vote margins with the PRI as the reference party from 1970 to 2009, 
and the observations within the five percent boundary. Available fiscal data restricts the sample to 
1,079 elections from 1994 to 2008. 
  
 One legitimate concern with the discontinuity design relates to external validity. Since only 
elections that were decided by close margins of victory are included in the sample, the majority of 
elections are excluded. It could be that these close elections are systematically widely different 
from those that are not close, and so the generalizability of any findings are cordoned to highly 
competitive environments. Indeed, the 1,079 elections that fall within the five percent victory 
margin bandwidth only make up about one fifth of all mayoral elections that occurred during these 
years. 
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Figure 1: Mexican Mayoral Elections by PRI 
Victory Margin
PRI 5% Victory PRI 5% Loss
Individual Municipal Elections Average Yearly Margin of Victory
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To alleviate this concern, I used a regression controlling for municipal and time fixed 
effects to analyze how two key control variables affect the likelihood that a municipality’s election 
was close enough to be included in the sample. Night time lights are a useful proxy that AidData 
provides for economic activity when traditional measures like GDP per capita are unavailable or 
unreliable, and population figures are available from Mexico’s Statistical Office (INEGI). These 
are useful variables to check the against inclusion in the sample because it intuitively could be that 
only wealthy, populated localities were politically competitive in this time. Such a skew within the 
sample relative to the broader population of elections could be problematic specifically to the case 
because much of Mexico is rural, but also because electoral dynamics are important to observe 
and understand outside of wealthy, densely occupied constituencies. Results for this regression are 
in Table 1. 
 
*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
 As expected, wealthier and more populous municipalities were more likely to be included 
in the sample. Such a bias is understandable given that more populous municipalities are 
strategically important to the all national political parties, so each would invest more resources in 
building support thus making elections there closer. Additionally, wealthier localities are likely to 
Table 1: Logit Regression
Difference Between Sample & Population of Elections
Time Frame: 1994-2008
Inclusion in Sample
Ln(Lights)
Coefficient 0.491***
Standard Error (0.132)
Ln(Population)
Coefficient 2.025***
Standard Error (0.363)
Observations 6,247
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have better educated citizens who are therefore more likely to have diverse political opinions. 
Thus, with a difference that is important to note, the effects observed in our analysis could be 
broadly applicable to other elections with that caveat.  
B - Quantifying Debt Behavior 
 First however, the method of measuring a municipality’s debt activity is important to 
discuss. As mentioned above, subnational governments have three sources of revenue: taxes, debt 
and interlevel transfers. These figures come from the SIMBAD database managed by the National 
Institute of Statistics and Geography (INEGI). Figure 2 illustrates the dramatic growth of the 
Mexican debt capital markets: in the seventeen years of the sample, annual debt issuance by 
subnational governments in Mexico increased by a factor of 31 times and only decreased in two 
years.  
 
Since we want to capture debt use within the context of other income sources that these 
mayors have access to, the log of debt issued is the dependent variable while the log of total income 
to their budgets is a critical control. The inclusion of income as a control helps capture how 
municipalities with larger budgets would likely have greater access to the debt capital markets 
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since they have more income to serve as collateral.  Thus, the first regression observing simply if 
political turnover affects debt behavior reads as follows: 
(1)𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
Where I observe how the randomized presence or absence of incumbent turnover at election year 
t in municipality i affects the proportion of debt financing in subsequent year t+1. I include a 
battery of controls (X) to account for potential spuriousness, as well as terms for municipality (𝛼) 
and time (𝑢) specific fixed effects. VoteShare is the percent margin of victory of the incumbent, 
and I interact it with the treatment of turnover to ensure the validity of the regression discontinuity 
design. The interaction term helps control for the fact that elections won by wider margins of 
victory away from 0 and towards five percent may have been more swayed by non-random voting.   
C - Synthesizing Party Difference 
 Also of interest is how heterogeneity between parties in terms of their incentives affects 
debt behavior. Mexico is an invaluable case for this purpose because the largest party for the 
majority of the 20th century was the Institutional Revolutionary Party, which is emblematic of a 
certain party type seen in many different contexts especially in the developing world.  As 
mentioned earlier, this party’s support base is mainly rural and low income. Given the theory on 
how a party’s support groups shape its incentives to engage in patronage, the expectation would 
be that the PRI would redistribute more than its competitors since the electoral returns of this tactic 
are higher given the fact that its base is more susceptible to transfers. Indeed, there is significant 
empirical evidence of this expectation; from teachers’ unions to complex systems of local brokers, 
the PRI has had and continues to enjoy a deeply entrenched infrastructure for promising and 
dispersing patronage (Larreguy et al., 2017). Timmons & Broid (2013) find evidence that, of the 
three major parties, only PRI governors misallocate transfers based on partisan preferences. 
Additionally, Benton & Smith (2017) find that PAN-led municipalities issue more debt while those 
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led by the leftist Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) issue less, so grouping these together 
would crudely average out the upwards and downwards biases. 
 The literature also tells us that executives, both local and national, make use of debt 
financing especially at low borrowing costs to fund distributions for supporters (Arias, 2018). 
Thus, the expectation should be that PRI governments would borrow more than non-PRI 
governments because the low cost of capital should be a draw to finance their relatively larger 
patronage network. The modified regression including this new variable is as follows: 
(2)𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + +𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
 Where Mayor is simply a dichotomous variable of whether or not the mayoral government 
elected in election year t was represented by the PRI or not. Although this would not capture the 
myriad differences between parties like the PAN or PRD, this still helps answer a key question left 
open by the existing literature. Prior studies have already observed how ideology affects a 
governing party’s likelihood to issue debt, with leftist parties likely to issue more. However, it is 
not clear from this observation if these parties are motivated by ideology or practical demands 
from their base in issuing more.  If the former case were true governments that are ideologically 
further left would likely issue more debt to spend on a greater role for the public sector in the 
economy. The draw of practicality would imply that parties with poorer bases and greater 
incentives to patronize would issue more debt to cheaply fund those distributions. The PRI is an 
ideal candidate to isolate the potential presence of the latter effect since it occupies a flexible 
middle ideological ground between the leftist PRD and center right PAN. 
Indeed, the large amount of evidence pointing to how unique the PRI is from rivals on its 
ideological right or left in terms of incentive and ability to engage in corruption helps justify the 
quantification of party difference in this analysis as PRI or not (Timmons & Broid 2013, Arias 
2018). However, a concern with this measurement is that it selects on the independent variable; 
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municipalities that elect PRI mayors could be systematically different from those that elect other 
parties in unobserved ways. To somewhat address this potential confounder, I regressed nighttime 
lights and population figures controlling for time and municipality fixed effects against whether 
or not a PRI mayor was elected in the 1,079 observations. The expectation would be that higher 
economic activity and population would depress the likelihood that a given municipality elected a 
PRI mayor since the party is known for its rural, poorer voting base. 
 
*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
 However, results in Table 2 do not corroborate this concern. Population nor wealth had 
statistically significant effects on whether or not a municipality in the sample elected a PRI mayor. 
Thus, PRI municipalities in this sample do not appear to be vastly different from non-PRI 
counterparts in such a way that it would invalidate the results. While the first regression isolates 
simply how a challenger party winning office affects subsequent debt issuance, this additional step 
adds in party difference as a potential explanatory variable.  
 
 
Table 2:  Effect of Wealth & Population on Likelihood of PRI Victory
Logit Panel Regression
Time Frame: 1994-2008
PRI Mayor
Ln(Lights)
Coefficient 0.381
Standard Error (0.412)
Ln(Population)
Coefficient -0.559
Standard Error (1.417)
Observations 1,079
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D - Effects of Government Conflict & Cooperation 
 To test a potential vertical government strength effect that I differentiated from previously 
studied horizontal strength earlier, it will be important to look at the interaction between these 
local mayors and higher officials in the government. While at the federal level the president is 
incredibly important, this analysis will not explore that office’s interaction with the municipalities 
because the variation in that higher office over the course of the sample is highly limited. However, 
the governors elected to lead each of those states are incredibly important. Just as the mayors have 
significant fiscal control within their municipalities, the governors are similarly powerful at the 
state level. This means that they could sway which municipalities get larger shares of state funding.  
A key factor that could inspire such a diversion of funds could be party conflict. A governor 
would want his party to succeed on local levels, so would try to restrict the access to low cost 
capital that rival mayors may enjoy. Benton (2017) offers some evidence that governors would 
strategically delay transfers of funds to mayors who had planned to use them for debt repayment.  
I test this relationship in two ways. First, in regression (3), I simply add a dichotomous variable 
(Governor) to regression (2) to observe how having a PRI governor ruling the overarching state of 
a municipality influences that local government’s borrowings. This addition would simply 
communicate, in isolation from all other factors, does state level party affiliation with clientele 
politics influence local government debt behavior.  
However, there is an additional way to conceptualize this test that better captures how the 
specific party relationship between mayor and governor could affect a municipality’s debt. In 
regression (4), I use an interaction term between the governor and mayor variables to measure the 
marginal effect on debt of each different party configuration between mayor and governor (i.e. 
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PRI mayor and non-PRI governor, PRI mayor and PRI governor, non-PRI mayor and PRI 
governor). The regressions read as follows: 
(3)𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + +𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛼𝑖
+ 𝑢𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
(4)𝐷𝑒𝑏𝑡 𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡+1 = 𝛽1𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3(𝑇𝑢𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟 ∗ 𝑉𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒)𝑖,𝑡 + +𝛽4𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6(𝐺𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡
∗ 𝑀𝑎𝑦𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡) + 𝛽7𝑋𝑖,𝑡+1 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝑢𝑡+1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡+1 
 
E - Controls 
 In each analysis I include terms for controls that are key in order to eliminate potential 
spuriousness. From INEGI, I source data on municipal population and take the log of this figure. 
This is useful to include because more populous municipalities may systematically have greater 
access to the debt markets given their ability to leverage larger tax bases as collateral. The same 
logic applies to a wealth proxy I include as a control. Since GDP/capita data is unavailable for the 
length of the sample at the municipal level, I leverage nighttime lights figures from AidData as an 
effective proxy for economic activity. Wealthier municipalities with more economic activity 
would likely also have greater access to the debt capital markets given the more affluent tax base. 
While the lights figure offers a useful measure of a municipality’s static wealth at a given point in 
time, an additional control that captures economic changes and potential shocks could be useful as 
well. For this purpose, I leverage municipality-specific data on the percent change in the value of 
agricultural production from year to year. 
 To address multicollinearity concerns, I include a correlation matrix of the three 
independent variables (Turnover, Mayor & Governor) and controls (Ln (Population), Ln (Lights), 
& Ln(Budget), ∆%Agriculture) in Table 3. The only correlation stronger than 0.05 among the 
independent variables (-0.384) between turnover and the mayor’s affiliation with the PRI is likely 
driven by the fact that as the party’s control on elections waned, new governments coming to 
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power were often necessarily from rival parties. However, this effect weakens as the sample 
continues in time and the PRI has to contend as an equal electoral rival, and even becomes a 
challenger turning over governments of its own. The only other notable correlations involving an 
independent variable exist between a municipality’s budget (-0.261) and wealth (0.129) 
associating with the state governor’s affiliation with the PRI. Timmons & Broid (2013) provide 
evidence that PRI governors do politically shuffle around transfers to the extent they can in ways 
that would depress local budgets. The association of the PRI with corruption may also mean 
municipalities have access to informal funds that would not be captured in the formal budget 
figures. The correlations among the three controls are intuitively sound, since more populous 
municipalities would generally have more economic activity and thus larger municipal budgets. 
   
5) Results 
A – Baseline Results 
 When controlling for economic activity, population, commodity swings, and municipal 
budget size, there is no evidence that turnover (1) affects debt funding in this sample (Table 4). 
Similarly, my analysis does not find a significant difference between the debt behavior of mayors 
who are members of the PRI (2) and those who are not. Zooming out from the mayor’s office, 
neither the party interaction between local and state government (4) nor the party affiliation of the 
Table 3: Correlations Matrix of Independent Variables and Controls
Observations: 1,079
Time Frame: 1994-2008
Turnover PRI Mayor PRI Governor Ln(Pop) Ln(Lights) Ln(Budget) ∆%Agriculture
Turnover 1.000
PRI Mayor -0.384 1.000
PRI Governor -0.0262 0.011 1.000
Ln(Pop) 0.005 0.000 0.057 1.000
Ln(Lights) -0.018 -0.027 0.129 0.252 1.000
Ln(Budget) 0.040 -0.018 -0.261 0.724 0.092 1.000
∆%Agriculture 0.027 -0.027 0.017 -0.054 -0.059 -0.060 1.000
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governor modelled separately (3) affected municipal debt issuance in this model. In the interaction 
term model (4), the Mayor row displays the effect of having a PRI mayor with a non-PRI governor, 
the Governor row signals how the presence of a PRI governor affects debt issuance when the 
mayor is not a member of the PRI, and Mayor X Governor signifies the effect of both office holders 
being members of the PRI. Figure 3 and 4 illustratee how there is not a significant difference 
between debt issuance by renewed incumbents and successful challenger around the margin of 
victory cutoff. The former accounts for the effects of the controls whereas the latter does not but 
shows all data points. 
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*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
 The lack of a relationship between turnover and debt funding has fascinating implications 
for the aforementioned tension between electoral change and policy stability. To the extent that 
newly elected parties that usurped office from an incumbent are insecure in their newfound 
position of power, the evidence here suggests that said insecurity does not manifest itself in more 
debt issuance. A prior assumption was that a positive relationship could signal that successful 
challengers were using the debt markets to fund client rewards, or in a more forgiving reading, 
were just more aggressive with funding new projects as a function of their insecurity first coming 
Table 4: Effect of Political Determinants on LN (Debt) - Linear Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 5%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient -0.424 -0.461 -0.426 -0.292
Standard Error (0.763) (0.769) (0.773) (0.774)
Vote Share
Coefficient 0.218 0.297 0.293 0.297
Standard Error (0.209) (0.287) (0.288) (0.287)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient -0.085 -0.079 -0.061 -0.077
Standard Error (0.282) (0.282) (0.284) (0.284)
Mayor
Coefficient -0.549 -0.625 -2.363
Standard Error (1.361) (1.369) (1.689)
Governor
Coefficient 0.658 -0.589
Standard Error (1.135) (1.337)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient -0.211
Standard Error (1.694)
Observations 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079
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to power. Either way, that outcome is suboptimal because the tax base would then be liable for 
debts issued either for corrupt, particularistic reasons or based on political calculus to be aggressive 
rather than economically deliberate. Thus, the lack of a relationship indicates that concerns about 
excess debt funding in electoral contexts with frequent or sudden turnover may need to take second 
priority to problems with more clear links to turnover such as hiring practices for public sector 
jobs. 
 In addition, these results hint that PRI mayors do not debt fund in the context of turnover 
any more or less than officeholders from other parties. The significance of this finding for our 
understanding of machine politics is that although some parties may engage in more patronage, 
which there is evidence that the PRI does, they do not necessarily fund a disproportionate amount 
of those distributions with debt when compared to their peers (Careaga & Weingast 2003, 
Timmons & Broid 2013, Larreguy et al. 2016) .  What this indicates for our understanding of how 
party difference affects debt behavior is not that these mayors are irrational in ignoring debt’s low 
cost relative to taxes, but that they instead have funding sources that are even more advantageous. 
These monies may come from transfers or informal party resources, but the evidence here 
downplays the importance of debt in financing political machines. 
 Debt issuance also does not seem to be swayed by politics beyond the municipality when 
analyzing the whole sample. Regression (3) includes the wider state governor’s membership or 
not in the PRI as a simple explanatory variable. The lack of a significant relationship here could 
indicate that on the borrower’s demand side, governors from the PRI are neither discouraging nor 
encouraging of debt use by mayors in their states or on the supply side, the state or local 
government being involved in machine politics does not influence lenders’ appetite to loan to these 
political leaders. There is also no significant relationship when the regression includes an 
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interaction term between the mayor and governor variable to capture the potential effect of vertical 
government coordination or conflict (4).  Thus, to the extent that governors want to aid local 
leaders from their party or hurt those from opposing camps, they choose not to as it applies to debt 
funding. 
 A key finding of this initial set of regressions is clear if we consider the supply side of debt. 
While this thesis focuses on the behavior of the local government subset of consumers in the debt 
market, it is critical to consider that on the opposite side of this interaction are investors and lenders 
who supply borrowed capital. Since these mayors are undertaking projects that are often times the 
largest in their municipality, the main investors supplying debt in this market need to be financial 
institutions with the asset scale to make these loans. In a virtuosic conceptualization of the capital 
markets, investors should be more risk averse to loaning funds for illicit projects because high 
penalties for complicity prohibitively raise the required rate of return.  It is commonly understood 
now as it was during the sample period that the PRI engaged in more patronage than its electoral 
rivals and used government funds from taxes, transfers, and debt to pay for these distributions 
(Careaga & Weingast 2003, Timmons & Broid 2013). However, the evidence here suggests that 
neither domestic or international institutions lent any less to local governments led by the PRI 
locally or operating under a PRI governor than they did to non-PRI counterparts.  
This finding carries potentially problematic implications as the debt capital markets in the 
developing world become more accessible. Normatively, the hope is that free market lenders are 
able and willing to discern types of borrowers and will abstain from lending to those that are more 
likely to engage in patronage. In this case, ability to observe types is not the issue as the PRI’s 
malfeasance was public knowledge.  
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An analogy to the famous Lemon Problem offers a pessimistic reading of this finding. In 
the Lemon Problem, market actors cannot with perfect confidence discern the type of actor they 
are transacting with. There is one type that transacts in good faith and a second type, “Lemons”, 
who act in bad faith and the return on trading with a Lemon will be negative. Market actors can 
use signals to gauge whether their interlocutor is a Lemon or not, but if the believed proportion of 
Lemons in the market gets too high, these actors will leave the market entirely. The example is not 
perfectly analogous to Mexico because there were corrupt non-PRI politicians and legitimate PRI-
led development projects that needed funding but suffice to say carrying a PRI membership card 
was a signal that some proportion of loaned funds would be put towards patronage. The expectation 
in the Lemon Problem is that investors would issue less to PRI mayors because of the clear signal 
that they are not acting in good faith or just exit the market entirely since so many mayors were 
PRI members (Akerlof, 1995).  
The data suggests that neither of these developments occurred because an assumption of 
the Lemon Problem is not true in this case. Returns for lending to PRI-Lemons were not lower 
than to other mayors because, historically, institutional checks on corruption or investing in 
corruption were weak (Careaga & Weingast, 2003). In this interpretation, a free capital market will 
not self-regulate to exclude corrupt borrowers. However, especially in the earlier half of the 
sample, most mayors were members of the PRI, so lenders may not have had the pricing power to 
discriminate. Additionally, the debt supply flowing to Mexican subnational governments did 
increase over the course of the sample as a wider diversity of parties came into power. Thus, there 
is still room for a somewhat idealistic view that, lenders will prefer borrowers who engage in less 
patronage if they are given a wider variety of potential borrowers. 
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With only four regressions, conclusions at this point should be considered tentative, and so 
I include three robustness checks that help to confirm these results and offer a more nuanced 
understanding of the full financial effects of turnover, patronage politics, and intergovernmental 
conflict.  In the first, I analyze a subsample of the observations that focus on when the PRI no 
longer held presidential power from 2001 to 2009. Next, I conduct the same test but restrict the 
regression discontinuity to a tighter win margin to ensure the identification strategy is robust. 
Finally, I use an alternative dependent variable to observe how the same selected political 
determinants may have affected outcomes that are directly related to debt issuance.  
B - Debt in PRI vs. PAN Rule 
 In 2000, Vincente Fox of the center-right National Action Party (PAN) won the presidential 
election and was sworn in just before the new year. This seminal election marked both the first 
time an opposition candidate had won the presidency since the beginning of the Mexican 
Revolution in the early 1900s and the first time the PRI had lost a national election since its 
founding. The sample tested above straddles this election, including both the final seven years of 
PRI rule and the first nine of the twelve-year PAN period of leadership in Mexico. This event is 
intrinsically important to the sample because, while the Mexican economic and political 
environment did not discretely and radically change on July 2, 2000, competitive dynamics were 
certainly different during either administration. Similarly, because the sample size of presidential 
administrations is so low, this test also could not make any causal declarations about how different 
federal governments could affect local finances. 
 The value in excluding observations from before the 2000 election comes from the 
potential concerns about different political dynamics during the two periods that may be obscured 
by aggregating the two together.  Local elections were broadly more competitive than they had 
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been in the past as the PRI’s hold on power continued to weaken under domestic and international 
pressure in the 1990s. However, there could still be worry that elections are being fraudulently 
swayed in the first portion of the sample, so the test should focus on the PAN years where the 
Mexican political system from top to bottom was generally more competitive.  Secondly, the latter 
PAN years conveniently capture the years of the new millennium where access to the debt capital 
markets would have been greater than in the preceding years. In addition, the Mexican government 
reformed municipal borrowing practices between 1997 and 2000, so focusing on the years after 
these reforms may better capture a more current regulatory environment for debt issuance (Benton, 
2017).  
 
*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
Table 5: Effect of Political Determinants on LN (Debt) - Linear Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 5%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient 0.059 0.247 0.434 0.436
Standard Error (1.221) (1.231) (1.246) (1.237)
Vote Share
Coefficient 0.076 -0.223 -0.252 -0.171
Standard Error (0.347) (0.436) (0.437) (0.437)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient 0.182 0.123 0.164 0.007
Standard Error (0.473) (0.475) (0.477) (0.989)
Mayor
Coefficient 2.404 2.441 0.178
Standard Error (2.134) (2.135) (2.538)
Governor
Coefficient 1.696 -0.366
Standard Error (1.751) (2.153)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient 3.749
Standard Error (2.776)
Observations 677 677 677 677
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 Results in Table 5 indicate that the observed relationship between the three key political 
determinants and debt issuance are robust to restricting the sample to the years of PAN national 
rule. Debt issuance remained unaffected by turnover, party-based incentives to patronize and 
intergovernmental alignment when political competition in the broader political environment was 
greater. 
 
C - Tighter Regression Discontinuity Restriction 
 In the regression discontinuity design, choosing where the cutoff on either side of the 
exogenous boundary should be is a critical choice for sampling. There is a direct trade-off between 
certainty of randomness in the sample which reinforces the argument for causality and size of the 
sample which allows for greater statistical power. At one extreme all elections would be included 
regardless of margin of victory. It would be impossible to say any results were more than a 
correlation or association, but the analysis would entail a picture of the entire universe of Mexican 
mayoral elections. At another extreme, the examination of turnover’s and machine politics’ effects 
on debt issuance could simply be a case study of two mayoral elections decided in either direction 
by a handful of votes. While perhaps interesting, these two elections in isolation would rigorously 
communicate effectively nothing about the relationship between these variables given all the 
idiosyncratic factors of the two elections biasing the results.  Increasing sample size flattens out 
the unique characteristics of each individual case by aggregating many different data points 
together. Thus, the broad inclusion favors external validity by including as many points as possible 
whereas strict adherence to points around the discontinuity prioritizes internal validity and the 
ability to make a causal claim given random sorting. 
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 The initial tests included here used a cutoff of five percent on either side of the margin of 
victory. There is a precedent in the literature for using a victory margin of plus or minus five 
percent as a way of including as many cases as possible to maintain statistical power while 
remaining close enough to the discontinuity to fulfill the randomness assumption (Eggers et al. 
2015, Brollo & Nannicinni 2012). However, to confirm the robustness of the results above I run 
the same test at a tighter percent cutoff around the win margin. In Table 6, the results for all 
Mexican mayoral elections from 1994-2008 that were won by less than four percent are shown. 
This tighter cutoff still maintains a significantly large sample size at 859 municipal elections. 
Similar to when I regress the political determinants against debt issuance in the whole five 
percent sample and that group split between the two different national administrations, there is no 
evidence of a relationship at this tighter cutoff.  This final result suggests that it can be confidently 
said that turnover, distributive politics, and intergovernmental conflict did not influence debt 
behavior by governments in this sample from 1994 to 2008. 
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*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
6) Alternative Dependent Variable Tests 
A - 5% Sample 
While debt funding is the focus of this thesis, it is important to consider that borrowing 
exists on a continuum of choices that governments have to fund the public sector. Scholars have 
identified two other broad categories of financing choices that are theoretically more politically 
costly: taxation and intergovernmental transfers. To gain a deeper understanding of how turnover, 
machine politics, and intergovernmental conflict affects an administration’s financing choices, it 
is critical to observe how the leaders in our sample lean on or abstain from each of these three 
options in the context of the selected political determinants.  
Table 6: Effect of Political Determinants on LN (Debt) - Linear Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 4%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient 0.384 0.473 0.513 0.675
Standard Error (0.897) (0.906) (0.910) (0.909)
Vote Share
Coefficient 0.134 -0.092 -0.092 -0.053
Standard Error (0.288) (0.415) (0.422) (0.420)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient -0.109 -0.147 -0.120 -0.141
Standard Error (0.411) (0.415) (0.418) (0.416)
Mayor
Coefficient 1.257 1.147 -1.054
Standard Error (1.713) (1.726) (2.089)
Governor
Coefficient 0.859 -0.868
Standard Error (1.442) (1.712)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient 1.398
Standard Error (2.139)
Observations 859 859 859 859
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 Using the same sample as for the debt tests, I regress the identical political determinants 
against the logged value of those municipalities’ receipts of transfers and internal revenue 
separately. The latter is calculated as the sum of taxes and fees the municipalities collected. The 
former is the sum of both federal and state transfers to the municipality. The most important type 
of transfer, called participaciones, are originally collected by the federal government with the 
purpose of redistribution to municipalities based on a consistent revenue sharing formula; the 
central government charges state governments with redistributing their allocation based on the 
formula to the municipalities below them (Timmons & Broid, 2013).  Results are in Tables 7 and 
8. 
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*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
Table 7: Effect of Political Determinants on LN (Transfers) - Linear Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 5%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient -0.481 -0.359 -0.270 -0.267
Standard Error (0.443) (0.443) (0.439) (0.442)
Vote Share
Coefficient 0.168 -0.095 -0.105 -0.105
Standard Error (0.122) (0.165) (0.164) (0.164)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient -0.233 -0.250 -0.203 -0.203
Standard Error (0.163) (0.163) (0.162) (0.162)
Mayor
Coefficient 1.825** 1.632** 1.597*
Standard Error (0.783) (0.779) (0.965)
Governor
Coefficient 1.688*** 1.663**
Standard Error (0.646) (0.765)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient 3.316***
Standard Error (0.968)
Observations 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079
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*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
 In both cases, turnover does not have a significant effect on either tax collection or transfer 
receipts. Taken in conjunction with the debt findings, this could indicate that turnover does not 
seem to affect fiscal behavior of executives upon taking office. A normatively positive 
interpretation of this result is that new coalitions that come into power nor incumbents who survive 
close elections do not radically change the fiscal practices of their new governments. This offers 
some optimism because it suggests continuity in public financing across changes in ideologically 
different governments as opposed to rapid changes and instability. 
 However, municipalities with PRI mayors received more transfers than those with mayors 
from other parties to a statistically significant degree. Not only that, but a municipality in a state 
Table 8: Effect of Political Determinants on LN (Taxes) - Linear Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 5%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient 0.015 0.018 -0.003 -0.004
Standard Error (0.074) (0.075) (0.073) (0.074)
Vote Share
Coefficient -0.015 -0.020 -0.018 -0.018
Standard Error (0.020) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient -0.003 -0.003 -0.014 -0.014
Standard Error (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027)
Mayor
Coefficient 0.037 0.083 0.090
Standard Error (0.132) (0.129) (0.161)
Governor
Coefficient -.393*** -0.388***
Standard Error (0.108) (0.127)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient -0.310*
Standard Error (0.161)
Observations 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079
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governed by the PRI, regardless of their local mayor’s party affiliation, received more transfers as 
well. The interaction term (4) highlights how it appears intergovernmental coordination may be 
taking place; the upwards effect of having just one of these two offices held by a PRI member 
almost doubles when both are party members. Given that this analysis observes PRI actors in 
isolation, it is unclear if these seemingly politically coordinated transfers are a result of the party’s 
greater involvement in patronage or simply coordination that would occur between any two 
politicians of the same party. 
 This is also a peculiar result because a state executive in charge of transfers to lower offices 
of government would likely want to prioritize political allies and freeze out rivals. However, the 
analysis here shows that non-PRI mayors do indeed receive significantly more transfers when the 
governor above them is a member of the PRI. This may be because, legally, it is difficult to enact 
formal policies that explicitly direct funds to certain governments based on party affiliation without 
facing a significant legal challenge. While this restriction may somewhat explain why PRI 
governors transfer more regardless of the recipient’s party affiliation, it does not explain why they 
transfer more than non-PRI governors. It may be that PRI governors, given their party’s reliance 
on a patronage network that needs a constant flow of income to survive, are willing to transfer 
greater amounts to all of their constituent mayors in order to get funds to their allies to keep the 
local hubs of this network liquid. Indeed, Timmons & Broid (2013) do find evidence that PRI 
governors, and not their PAN or PRD counterparts, do misallocate approximately four percent of 
formula-delineated participaciones to allied municipalities; such deviations are possible partially 
because state legislative oversight is weak. These results indicate that governors that are part of a 
national party patronage infrastructure and who have greater incentive to engage in clientelism 
may be more generous with transfers to municipalities under their jurisdiction. 
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These transfer effects become even more intriguing when we consider that municipalities 
with a PRI governor in their state collect fewer taxes than with a non-PRI governor. Both when 
regressed against taxes alone (3) and as an interaction with the mayor’s party affiliation (4) the 
PRI governor variable has a significant and negative effect. Mexican mayors, regardless of their 
own party affiliation, collect fewer taxes when the governor above them is a member of the PRI, 
according to this data. Part of this may be explained by the observed transfer relationship. Mayors 
in PRI-controlled states receive greater transfer receipts, so collect fewer taxes. This dynamic fits 
the theoretical framework as these executives are substituting away from the higher cost capital 
source in the form of taxes for the greater transfers they have available to them. 
One possible explanation may relate to ideological preferences for fiscal policy. In the late 
20th century, the PRI began to pivot to a more conservative and neoliberal stance economically.  
The presidential administrations of Miguel de la Madrid and Carlos Salinas de Gortari stripped 
back the role of the Mexican state in the economy, converting many state-run enterprises towards 
privatization. Thus, many state-level PRI administrations may have encouraged local governments 
to collect fewer taxes in keeping with the party policy platform in order to encourage growth. 
However, the PRI’s main competitor for state governorships during the sample period was the 
PAN, a pro-business center-right party that likely would not have been any less encouraging of tax 
relief. Similarly, the hypothesis would not explain why the PRI mayor variable would not also 
have a depressive effect on tax collections directly since those mayors have the same partisan 
encouragements as PRI governors. Thus, this ideological argument is not entirely satisfying. 
 Another argument directly related to machine politics may better explain how these mayors 
are able to collect fewer taxes to such an extent when the governor above them is a member of the 
PRI. Since the PRI is known to be more involved in patronage politics than its rivals, PRI-
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controlled states may be more corrupt at even the local level than non-PRI controlled counterparts. 
Thus, mayors in such states may be strategically taxing less to avoid the associated political costs 
by making up for that loss via informal revenues. These would not be reported in the SIMBAD 
data and would help explain the large discrepancy in tax collection between mayors in PRI and 
non-PRI states regardless of party. Similar to the debt analysis I tested the robustness of these 
results for taxes and transfers by conducting the sample boundary restriction and sample split.  
In addition, since access to the debt markets at all can be restrictive it could be that the key 
decision point that the political determinants influence is not how much a government will issue, 
but whether they issue at all. Indeed, as is visible in Figure 4, a majority of municipality-years in 
the sample issued no debt at all.  Thus, I include a logit regression of the same political 
determinants against a dichotomous measure of whether or not a given municipality issued debt or 
not. Results are in Table 9 and reinforce the earlier findings that the decision to issue debt, 
measured as either a categorical affirmative or negative or instead as a quantity of pesos, was not 
influenced by these political determinants.  
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*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
B - PAN National Rule 
  Table 10 shows the effects of the selected political determinants on transfer receipts of 
Mexican municipalities during the period of PAN national rule, respectively. The positive effect 
that PRI leadership had on transfer receipts disappears statistically in terms of the mayor’s effect 
and weakens significantly in terms of the governor’s. It could be that this association between PRI 
leadership and increased transfers weakened during PAN rule because, without control of the 
wider state, PRI leaders at local and state levels faced greater accountability and less flexibility in 
Table 9: Effect of Political Determinants on Debt (Categorical) - Logit Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 5%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient -0.103 -0.099 -0.088 -0.071
Standard Error (0.106) (0.292) (0.292) (0.299)
Vote Share
Coefficient 0.106 0.102 0.098 0.107
Standard Error (0.077) (0.101) (0.102) (0.103)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient -0.051 -0.052 -0.040 -0.055
Standard Error (0.101) (0.101) (0.103) (0.104)
Mayor
Coefficient 0.031 -0.012 -0.829
Standard Error (0.476) (0.482) (0.663)
Governor
Coefficient 0.307 -0.155
Standard Error (0.408) (0.483)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient 0.173
Standard Error (0.608)
Observations 1,079 1,079 1,079 1,079
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misappropriating transfers to party allies. This finding reinforces the intuition that greater electoral 
competition and diversity of party control at different levels of the state reduces the opportunities 
for malfeasance. 
 Meanwhile, Table 11 highlights how the negative effect on taxes did not only weaken in 
the PAN period of the sample, it disappeared entirely. Part of this may be explained by the 
substitution effect discussed earlier. If, before the PRI lost national control, mayors were able to 
substitute away from taxes and towards transfers that they could receive based on partisan 
influence, once those elevated transfers weakened with greater intra-state competition taxes would 
likely have to return to non-PRI norms as well.  
The disappearance of statistical significance prompts a discussion of a key drawback with 
restricting the number of observations to analyze potentially important subsamples. If the observed 
effect of PRI governors on tax collections in the broader sample is statistically significant but 
weak, then it will be harder to be certain of that relationship in each subsample that has a smaller 
number of observations and thus more noise.  
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*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
Table 10: Effect of Political Determinants on LN (Transfers) - Linear Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 5%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient 0.007 0.006 0.026 0.026
Standard Error (0.052) (0.053) (0.052) (0.052)
Vote Share
Coefficient 0.002 0.004 0.001 0.000
Standard Error (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient -0.003 -0.003 0.002 0.003
Standard Error (0.020) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
Mayor
Coefficient -0.018 -0.014 0.006
Standard Error (0.091) (0.089) (0.107)
Governor
Coefficient 0.181** 0.199**
Standard Error (0.073) (0.091)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient 0.170
Standard Error (0.118)
Observations 678 678 678 678
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*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
Table 12 displays the effects of the three political determinants on whether or not a 
municipal government issued debt using a logistic regression. Just as in the previous tests related 
to debt issuance: neither turnover, party difference, or intergovernmental alignment had a 
statistically significant effect on the decision to issue.  
Table 11: Effect of Political Determinants on LN (Taxes) - Linear Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 5%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient 0.007 0.026 0.041 0.041
Standard Error (0.111) (0.111) (0.113) (0.113)
Vote Share
Coefficient -0.021 -0.052 -0.054 -0.056
Standard Error (0.031) (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient 0.015 0.009 0.012 0.017
Standard Error (0.043) (0.043) (0.043) (0.044)
Mayor
Coefficient 0.248 0.251 0.312
Standard Error (0.193) (0.193) (0.232)
Governor
Coefficient 0.138 0.194
Standard Error (0.159) (0.197)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient 0.399
Standard Error (0.254)
Observations 678 678 678 678
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*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
 
C - 4% Sample 
 As with the analysis of debt, tightening the victory margin restriction for the regressions of 
these political determinants on taxes and transfers will grant a greater sense for the robustness of 
these results. Tables 13 and 14 display them below. 
Table 12: Effect of Political Determinants on Debt (Categorical) - Logit Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 5%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient -0.138 -0.005 0.176 0.082
Standard Error (0.537) (0.558) (0.592) (0.661)
Vote Share
Coefficient 0.043 -0.095 -0.124 -0.133
Standard Error (0.157) (0.196) (0.210) (0.225)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient 0.053 0.028 0.019 0.010
Standard Error (0.201) (0.200) (0.207) (0.218)
Mayor
Coefficient 1.080 1.303 -0.045
Standard Error (0.919) (0.984) (1.251)
Governor
Coefficient 1.028 0.118
Standard Error (0.818) (0.996)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient 2.172
Standard Error (1.595)
Observations 678 678 678 678
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*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
Table 13: Effect of Political Determinants on LN (Transfers) - Linear Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 4%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient -0.725 -0.571 -0.487 -0.475
Standard Error (0.544) (0.544) (0.540) (0.544)
Vote Share
Coefficient 0.018 -0.375 -0.375 -0.372
Standard Error (0.175) (0.253) (0.251) (0.252)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient 0.113 0.046 0.103 0.102
Standard Error (0.249) (0.249) (0.248) (0.249)
Mayor
Coefficient 2.188** 1.953* 1.796
Standard Error (1.027) (1.024) (1.251)
Governor
Coefficient 1.819** 1.696
Standard Error (0.856) (1.025)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient 3.730***
Standard Error (1.280)
Observations 859 859 859 859
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*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
 The depressive effect that PRI governors had on tax collections in municipalities is robust 
to this tighter boundary, while the positive effect they had on transfers is as well but in a unique 
way. The positive effect of having a PRI mayor or governor appear robust in isolation in 
regressions (2) and (3), but (4) illustrates how the statistically significant upwards bias comes when 
both are in power at the same time. Localities with a PRI mayor under a non-PRI governor and 
vice versa did not receive greater transfers when I account for this interaction effect. What this 
communicates is that the particular party type of a given leader may not be as important as their 
level of support at other levels of the state. In keeping with Timmons’ & Broids’(2013) findings, 
PRI mayors do seem to channel transfers to local allies. Restricting the sample also maintained the 
Table 14: Effect of Political Determinants on LN (Taxes) - Linear Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 4%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient 0.059 0.045 0.022 0.032
Standard Error (0.083) (0.084) (0.081) (0.082)
Vote Share
Coefficient 0.000 0.037 0.037 0.039
Standard Error (0.027) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient -0.001 0.005 -0.011 -0.012
Standard Error (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
Mayor
Coefficient -0.207 -0.142 -0.276
Standard Error (0.159) (0.154) (0.187)
Governor
Coefficient -0.508*** -0.614***
Standard Error (0.129) (0.154)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient -0.687***
Standard Error (0.192)
Observations 859 859 859 859
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robustness of the debt results even when quantified as the decision to issue instead of the amount 
of pesos borrowed. Said decision was unaffected by the political determinants, as is displayed in 
Table 15. 
 
*: p-value < 0.10 
**: p-value < 0.05 
***: p-value < 0.01 
 
7) Discussion 
Given all this information, it is important to reemphasize that the goal of this analysis is to 
observe and understand the ways in which political influences distort how governments finance 
the state. Ideally, leaders collect funds from taxpayers, borrow against the tax base of their 
constituency, or partake in intergovernmental transfers in order to improve economic equity and 
efficiency. However, in practice, there is significant evidence of various political factors biasing 
Table 15: Effect of Political Determinants on Debt (Categorical) - Logit Panel Regression
Mexican Mayoral Election-Years within 4%
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Turnover
Coefficient 0.338 0.426 0.439 0.524
Standard Error (0.357) (0.371) (0.372) (0.392)
Vote Share
Coefficient 0.039 -0.089 -0.079 -0.054
Standard Error (0.113) (0.159) (0.160) (0.166)
Turnover x Vote Share
Coefficient -0.004 -0.025 -0.017 -0.022
Standard Error (0.158) (0.159) (0.161) (0.162)
Mayor
Coefficient 0.724 0.660 -0.380
Standard Error (0.635) (0.643) (0.871)
Governor
Coefficient 0.315 -0.389
Standard Error (0.543) (0.678)
Mayor x Governor
Coefficient 0.649
Standard Error (0.823)
Observations 859 859 859 859
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these decisions, and it is materially important to observe how these biases function because they 
can make the economy less equitable and efficient.   
A - Turnover 
 The regression discontinuity design offers the greatest support in internal validity to 
turnover’s effect on the fiscal variables because the closeness of the observed elections means that 
the treatment of those municipal-years with new leadership or not is as good as random. Generally, 
there was no evidence of a statistically significant effect of turnover on any of the three fiscal 
variables. This finding is incredibly important for our understanding of how electoral change 
affects the state. It could be assumed that new governments that come into power, especially where 
institutional checks are weak and there is not a long history of robust electoral competition, could 
be inexperienced at fiscal management or impatient to build voter support. Such insecure new 
leaders may over-issue to fund excessive projects or cut taxes to build goodwill. Lenders may even 
restrict a new government's access to capital, which could be a suboptimal sign of markets 
discounting policy innovation. However, the data does not support the existence of any of these 
dynamics. Municipalities that underwent turnover do not raise capital via debt or taxes 
significantly more or less than those where the incumbent party survived. This evidence suggests 
that turnover is not a cause of detrimental fiscal behavior by governments.  
B - Machine Politics & Coordination 
 The variables that capture the state and local governments’ association with Mexico’s main 
patronage system highlight the nuanced ways that machine politics can affect how distributive 
leaders fund the public sectors. Of note first is that the mayor’s affiliation with the PRI or not had 
no impact on the amount of debt that municipal government borrowed. The implications of this 
are interesting from the perspective of both the demand and supply of debt. For the former, 
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although there is evidence PRI governments spend a greater proportion of their budgets on 
patronage, this analysis suggests that they do not debt-fund more than their counterparts from other 
parties which could imply that other sources of capital such as transfers could be similarly cost 
effective in financing clientelism. Additionally, in comparing patronage incentives to issue to 
ideological ones, this analysis does not find evidence for the former. PRI-aligned governments 
were not more likely to issue, which may be because of other accessible capital sources but also 
may be due to a weaker desire for expansionary fiscal policy that would require greater issuance. 
   From a supply side though, the fact that PRI and non-PRI governments are borrowing 
roughly similar amounts suggests that they may have comparable access to the capital markets. 
Since it was common knowledge that PRI mayors would spend borrowed funds on inefficient 
distributions, lenders should have lent them less as a function of higher interest rates for the greater 
risk. The absence of such a finding here suggests that the sovereign debt markets may not 
effectively price corruption in a way that would punish governments that participate and reward 
those that abstain. 
 There is already some scholarship that seems to concur with the idea that market 
inefficiencies could be at work among investors in sovereign bonds. Brooks et al. (2015) propose 
a “Contagion Effect” in sovereign debt markets wherein investors use peer groups made up of 
comparable issuers to evaluate the proper interest rate for a new issuance, but since the universe 
of sovereign issuers is neither as large or comparable as corporate bonds, factors negatively 
affecting one government may harm the access to capital of others that successfully avoided those 
headwinds. For example, in the wake of a corruption scandal surrounding one Mexican 
municipality many others would likely face higher borrowing costs through no fault of their own 
in a way that could stall development. Similarly, Maxfield (1998) finds that investors in sovereign 
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bonds from the Global South react much more strongly to changes in the global financial 
environment to any local policy initiative by political leaders. 
 Unlike with debt, machine politics have a statistically negative influence on the taxes a 
given municipality levied and a positive one on the transfers it received. However, it is still unclear 
if these effects were associated with the PRI’s incentives to patronize or arrangements in which 
the party could coordinate preferential treatment for allies via control of the mayor’s and 
governor’s offices. A municipality in a state governed by the PRI  collected  fewer taxes and 
receives more transfers. This dynamic implies some substitution towards the lower cost transfers, 
but also leaves room for interpretation as to what explains the remainder of the gap. It could be 
that states where the PRI holds power are generally more corrupt, so mayors of all stripes are able 
to collect informal revenues that make up for the lower tax revenue.   
To generalize the observed relationship, the evolution of this dynamic from the years of  
PAN national rule may imply that greater political competition makes political leaders less likely 
to abuse discretion over transfers for partisan gain given higher costs. An interesting finding 
relative to transfers was that more coordination occurred than punishment. Localities with non-
PRI mayors in a PRI state did not receive fewer transfers, but neighboring municipalities ruled by 
the PRI would receive more. With that said, it would be presumptuous to dismiss the idea that 
punishment did not occur. Timmons & Broid (2013) offer illustrative anecdotal evidence that 
highlights how such favoritism affected the political sphere and how political actors themselves 
believed such dynamics were at work: 
 
In 1993, for example, a local opposition congressman from Puebla accused the state government 
of ‘‘threatening and forcing Mayors to work with the PRI in order to receive their participaciones’’ 
(Ramirez 1993). Several years later, the city of Puebla accused the 
state governor of illegally retaining participaciones destined for PAN municipalities 
and of illegally channeling participaciones to a development program sponsored by 
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the governor (Ramirez 2000). In 2002, the PAN’s candidate for governor of Nuevo 
Leon claimed the sitting PRI administration had illegally diverted federal transfers 
to local PRI strongmen (‘‘caciques’’) (Garcı´a et al. 2002). During roughly the same 
period, a series of municipalities sued their state governments for inappropriately 
and opaquely allocating federal transfers, culminating in a unanimous Federal 
Supreme Court ruling in 2004, which declared that all states must establish a ‘‘clear 
and reasonable’’ basis for distributing participaciones among local governments; the 
Court also required states to pay interest for allocations retained for any reason 
(Avile´s 2004a, b). Despite the Court’s ruling, in 2008, federal legislators from 
opposition parties in Oaxaca accused the state government of diverting 
participaciones for pet projects and asked the Federal Supreme Auditor (ASF) to review all 
participaciones transferred by Oaxaca in 2007 (Sanchez 2008). (557) 
 
 This finding suggests that, where institutional commitments to fair electoral competition are weak 
and one party controls a significant portion of the state, public finances may be transferred in ways 
that both hurt the economy but also harm burgeoning political competition. However, it is notable 
that, to the extent that these tactics existed, they did not completely stall the rising anger that would 
oust the PRI. In terms of applying the Weak Government Hypothesis to vertical relations within 
the state, the evidence does not seem to support its applicability. Party differences between the 
municipal and state government did not lead to greater debt issuance. Instead, party unity across 
these two levels of government still contributed to detrimental fiscal policies in the form of partisan 
transfers. This dynamic may result from a disconnect in the incentives assumed by the Weak 
Government Hypothesis and those at work and explored by more recent scholarship. In both, 
individual politicians want to prolong their careers by winning good will with voters. In Roubini 
& Sachs’ (1989) original framework, leaders want to come to reach budget compromises, which 
are easier to do with party unity. However, these results seem to support Queralt’s (2018) & Tilly’s 
(1990) theory that constituent support can be just as easily won by eschewing necessary budget 
compromises in favor of politically expedient sources of capital. Instead of sovereign level debt, 
this analysis finds this dynamic may exist for transfers that are easier to access when party unity 
is strong. 
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8) Conclusion 
A - Design Considerations 
Implementing a regression discontinuity that restricts the sample to observations around a 
specific cutoff means the time period of the sample needed to be as large as possible to increase 
the number of data points to a statistically significant level. Luckily, Mexico proved to be a useful 
case since data on debt amounts dates back to the 1990s when local political competition was 
beginning to heat up. However, taking a longer historical view meant eschewing more recent data 
that elaborates on the specifics of how debt is issued, for example. The Secretary of the Treasury 
and Public Credit has released data on the type of lender and maturity length on most municipal 
debts since 2005. Although insightful research already exists on how partisanship affect these debt 
characteristics, it could have been useful to see if certain types of investors were more wary of 
post-turnover municipalities than others (Benton 2017; Benton & Smith, 2017). As access to the 
debt markets grows within Mexico and beyond, the level of precision and depth with which 
analyses like these can offer insights about the politics of funding the public sector can increase 
substantially. 
In addition, an advantage of Mexico as a case was the ubiquitous presence of a party that was 
uniquely strong in terms of patronage but weak in ideological attachment to try and isolate effects 
of that former trait instead of the latter. However, the grouping of non-PRI parties together may 
cause concern. Included in the earlier design discussion is significant historical and quantitative 
evidence that partially justifies such a practice because the PRI was so distinct from parties to its 
ideological left and right. For maximum robustness though, distinguishing dynamics between 
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parties like the PRD and PAN is still important especially as the differences between them grow 
with the decline of the PRI.  
Although the regression discontinuity design offers stronger internal validity since treatment 
with turnover is as good as random, external validity is a concern. It could be that the municipalities 
with elections that were not decided by close margins were systematically different from those in 
this sample, and as such these results could only be generalized to close elections. This is a 
legitimate concern as PRI strongholds were traditionally rural, underpopulated, and poor. 
However, as the number of mayoral elections that are competitive has increased with the rise of 
robust elections in Mexico, these results may be more generalizable. 
One source of rents that is intrinsically important to the Mexican case is petroleum. The state 
controlled national corporation PEMEX operates most oil enterprises in the country; oil deposits 
vary geographically between municipalities across the country. Isolating royalties to municipal 
governments could integrate an important local-government perspective on the resource curse, but 
unfortunately I was unable to include this variable. To some extent, difference in resource 
endowments across municipalities would have been captured by the geographic fixed effects in 
my analysis. Additionally, royalties flowing from PEMEX to municipalities would have been 
included in the total municipal budget inflow control I included, so although the isolated effect of 
oil rents may not be included it is not completely omitted. 
Finally, a central issue in any analysis of public fiscal data is its validity. Although the Mexican 
state is more transparent and comprehensive with its data than many other regional peers, 
intentional misreporting by corrupt local governments is a legitimate concern especially earlier in 
the sample when institutional checks were weaker. However, since the focus of this analysis is 
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municipalities where elections are very competitive, such governments were likely under higher 
scrutiny to report accurate data relative to localities that were rarely-contested party strongholds.  
B - Implications 
Does electoral change in leadership lead to swings in how politicians fund the state? This 
paper finds no evidence that turnover affects how governments finance the public sector. The lack 
of evidence for a relationship between electoral changes and borrowing can assuage cynicism 
about potential negative impacts of turnover. As voting citizens, it is important for us to know that 
we can select new leadership without fear that those politicians will mortgage the future once 
elected. Indeed, a common argument of incumbents seeking reelection or skeptics of challengers 
to longstanding governments is that turnover brings instability and inexperience. The data here 
indicates that such a gloomy narrative may not apply to funding the state to the extent one would 
assume.  
From a broader perspective, these results offer some relief for supporters of debt as a 
funding tool for the public sector since it was the least affected by political variables of the three 
financing sources although selective enforcement of debt limits and market mispricing of 
corruption are concerns. Although patronage-inclined PRI leadership did bias the transfers a 
municipality received and the taxes it collected, this relationship may be better explained by their 
support from allied governors above them rather than their ties to distributional politics. Evidence 
here suggests that partisan executives will use discretion over the state budget to support allies 
regardless of restrictions. Such findings are important for our understanding of a growing trend 
throughout the world towards decentralization of budgeting responsibility and greater access to 
the capital markets. 
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